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FRAUDULENT AGGREGATION: THE EFFECT OF DAIMLER AND
WALDEN ON MASS LITIGATION
Jeff Lingwall and Chris Wray*
Abstract
This Article examines the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisdictional tightening in Daimler and Walden on mass litigation. This
Article shows how the Supreme Court’s changes to general and specific 
jurisdiction, considered together, end the practice of tactically allocating 
non-diverse plaintiffs across state lines to defeat diversity jurisdiction in 
nationwide litigation, a doctrine this Article terms fraudulent 
aggregation. This Article places the doctrine of fraudulent aggregation in 
the context of fraudulent joinder, the emerging doctrine of fraudulent 
misjoinder, and other attempts to avoid federal court jurisdiction through 
artful pleading. Examples from recent products liability litigation show 
both the application of the doctrine and the challenges facing its 
adoption—chiefly whether lower courts attempt to recreate general 
jurisdiction under the guise of expanded specific jurisdiction. 
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INTRODUCTION
Academics have widely criticized the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional 
tightening in Daimler AG v. Bauman1 and Walden v. Fiore.2 By tethering 
jurisdiction more closely to a defendant’s conduct and home states, the 
argument goes, plaintiffs have lost needed flexibility in their choice of 
forum.3 This Article urges a different view. In the context of mass actions, 
the bread and butter of modern products liability litigation, the Court’s 
adjustments to personal jurisdiction end the practice of tactically 
allocating non-diverse plaintiffs across state lines to defeat diversity.4 By 
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1. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
2. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). As this Article went to press, the Supreme Court decided a 
follow-up case, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., No. 16-466 (2017) which 
strengthened Daimler and Walden in the context of mass litigation. This decision reinforced the 
specific jurisdiction analysis in Walden to avoid the possibility of recreating pre-Daimler general 
jurisdiction, in line with the analysis of this Article. See infra note 161 for further discussion.
3. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1118; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 749–50. For academic commentary, 
see, for example, Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the Minimum Contacts Test, 11 SETON HALL 
CIR. REV. 1, 39 (2014) (“[W]e are left with a rigid jurisdictional structure that looks remarkably 
like the nineteenth and early twentieth century structure that the Court claimed to have torn down 
to erect the minimum contacts test.”); Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye 
Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST.
L.J. 101, 107 (2015) (“This Article argues that the Court has moved too far, too fast towards 
limiting the traditional power of states to require nonresident corporations to answer lawsuits in 
their courts. While the latest decision may achieve a level of certainty and predictability for which 
some commentators have longed, it has done so at the cost of restricting access to courts and 
through an exercise of tenuous constitutional authority that trespasses on the power of states and 
precludes more appropriate regulation by Congress.” (footnote omitted)); Bernadette Bollas 
Genetin, The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 68 SMU L. REV. 107, 108 
(2015) (“The Court’s restriction of general jurisdiction . . . raises real concerns.”); John T. Parry, 
Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction After Bauman and Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607, 607 
(2015) (noting “the striking disparity between the protections [Bauman] gives to corporations and 
the vulnerability it creates for individuals”); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke 
Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 211 
(2014) (“The two cases . . . will significantly shift the balance of power in civil litigation.”). 
4. Many of the examples in this Article are drawn from recent removal contests in products 
liability litigation. See, e.g., Dekalb v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. CV-15-6063-R, 2015 WL 6134339, at 
*1–2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015) (aggregating ninety-three women in a filing in California state 
court, including three non-diverse plaintiffs to defeat diversity); Evans v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 
2:14–cv–29700, 2015 WL 1650402, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 14, 2015) (aggregating ninety-five
plaintiffs, including one plaintiff from New Jersey, and filing in Texas state court to defeat 
diversity with New Jersey defendant); Kraft v. Johnson & Johnson, 97 F. Supp. 3d 846, 849 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2015) (aggregating plaintiffs in a Texas state court filing and including one plaintiff from 
New Jersey to attempt to defeat diversity with New Jersey defendant).
2
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doing so, Daimler and Walden create the doctrine this Article terms
fraudulent aggregation,5 a plaintiff-side parallel to fraudulent joinder that 
reduces gamesmanship and preserves defendants’ access to federal courts 
in mass litigation.6
In both fraudulent aggregation and fraudulent joinder, plaintiffs seek 
to defeat federal court jurisdiction through creative pleading. In the 
familiar case, a plaintiff attempts to defeat diversity by including a non-
diverse “discardable” defendant in her complaint, against whom the 
plaintiff has no colorable claim.7 The doctrine of fraudulent joinder 
polices this behavior.8 In fraudulent aggregation, an attorney seeking to 
consolidate claims in mass litigation attempts to avoid federal court by 
tactically allocating her clients across state lines.9 By spreading filings 
for non-diverse plaintiffs across multiple states and aggregating with 
other diverse plaintiffs, the attorney has her cake and eats it, too—gaining 
the efficiency of a mass action along with a favorable state court 
jurisdiction. 
For example, suppose an attorney develops a product liability theory 
against BigCorp based on personal injury. BigCorp is a New Jersey 
corporation, headquartered in New Jersey, which sells product 
nationwide through various distribution channels. BigCorp’s product is 
widely used, so thousands of people across the country are potential
plaintiffs. When considering how to initially structure the action, the 
attorney has two considerations: (1) her time is limited, so she does not 
want to manage thousands of individual cases, and (2) she prefers to 
litigate in state courts due to past success. Ideally, she would form a 
                                                                                                                     
5. As with fraudulent joinder, this Article will use the term “fraudulent aggregation” 
referring to both the problem and the doctrine that polices the problem, in this case the tactical 
allocation of plaintiffs to defeat diversity in mass litigation and the application of Daimler and 
Walden to those plaintiffs.
6. Fraudulent aggregation is distinct from the emerging doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder,
which also concerns plaintiff-side joinder to defeat diversity. Fraudulent aggregation is based on 
joinder of plaintiffs over whom the court lacks jurisdiction due to Daimler and Walden. See infra
Parts III–IV. Fraudulent misjoinder is based on the misjoinder of sham plaintiffs under Rule 20. 
See In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 624 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing fraudulent 
misjoinder); Woodside v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., Inc., No. 4:13-CV-2463 (CEJ), 2014 WL 
169637, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 2014) (examining whether “sham” plaintiffs had been 
improperly joined). See generally Torres v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:14–cv–29741, 2015 WL 
4888749, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 17, 2015) (noting that fraudulent misjoinder “may require 
passage upon unsettled jurisdictional grounds” but that personal jurisdiction arguments are 
“relatively simple”).
7. See Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry., 336 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2003).
8. E.g., Junk v. Terminix Int’l Co., 628 F.3d 439, 445 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining the 
doctrine of fraudulent joinder); Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining the 
doctrine of fraudulent joinder).
9. See supra note 4; infra Parts III–IV.
3
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nationwide class action or a series of state-specific class actions, but class 
actions rarely succeed for personal injury liability theories due to the 
weight of individual issues.10 While checking to ensure the cases will be 
manageable, the attorney decides to simply group all her plaintiffs into 
several large state-court filings.11
With this strategy in place, the attorney’s only remaining challenge is 
to defeat removal based on diversity jurisdiction. Because BigCorp is a 
citizen of New Jersey, complete diversity exists between it and the 
citizens of each other state. If the attorney groups all her California 
plaintiffs into one filing, for example, BigCorp will remove to federal 
court.12 But here, the attorney has an ace up her sleeve: because hundreds 
of potential plaintiffs live in each state, hundreds live in New Jersey. 
These New Jersey plaintiffs can be allocated among the filings in other 
state courts. By including at least one New Jersey, non-diverse plaintiff
with each mass filing in other states, diversity jurisdiction is defeated and 
the cases remain where filed.  
This Article shows how Daimler and Walden, taken together, end such 
nationwide sprinkling of plaintiffs to avoid federal court. Daimler
restricts general jurisdiction to states where a defendant is essentially at 
home,13 and Walden limits specific jurisdiction to forums connected to 
the defendant’s conduct towards the claims of each plaintiff.14 If a 
plaintiff’s only connection to the forum state is through aggregation with 
other plaintiffs to defeat diversity, and if the defendant is not at home in 
that state, then Daimler and Walden require dismissing the plaintiff for 
lack of personal jurisdiction.15 After the non-diverse plaintiffs are 
dismissed, a federal court would properly exercise its jurisdiction over 
the remaining diverse plaintiffs with connections to the forum through 
                                                                                                                     
10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23, advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“A ‘mass 
accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action 
because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and 
defenses of liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these 
circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into 
multiple lawsuits separately tried.”); Jeremy T. Grabill, The Pesky Persistence of Class Action 
Tolling in Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 433, 454 (2014) (“Thus, whether 
resulting from the lack of class cohesion, the existence of choice-of-law complexities, or judicial 
discomfort with all-or-nothing trials, personal injury claims are no longer certified as litigation 
classes.”).
11. She will likely limit these groups to less than 100 plaintiffs each to avoid BigCorp 
removing to federal court based on the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(5)(B) (2012).
12. In personal injury claims the $75,000 amount in controversy is usually easily satisfied. 
See infra Part IV.
13. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
14. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014).
15. See infra Part III.
4
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the defendant’s conduct.16 This extension of fraudulent joinder fulfills the 
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)’s extension of broad federal court 
jurisdiction over mass actions, by “mak[ing] it harder for plaintiffs’ 
counsel to ‘game the system’ by trying to defeat diversity jurisdiction.”17
Part I reviews the history of pleading around federal court jurisdiction, 
including fraudulent joinder, stipulations to the amount in controversy, 
and allocation of non-diverse plaintiffs across state lines. Part II discusses 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional developments, and Part III applies the 
Court’s developments to mass actions through the doctrine of fraudulent 
aggregation. Part IV discusses challenges to the development of the 
doctrine, particularly through attempts to recreate pre-Daimler general 
jurisdiction under the guise of expanded specific jurisdiction. 
I. PLEADING AROUND FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs often prefer to litigate in state courts, and some state courts 
in particular, perceiving them as more plaintiff-friendly than federal 
courts.18 Defendants usually prefer federal court,19 and so forum selection 
conflicts are routine in civil litigation.20 Because diversity jurisdiction is 
                                                                                                                     
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
17. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005).
18. See RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED 
FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988) (“As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth 
from out-of-state companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my 
sleep enhanced when I give someone else’s money away, but so is my job security . . . .” (quoting 
Richard Neely, former member of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals)); AM. TORT 
REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 22–23, 32 (2015) http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/JudicialHellholes-2015.pdf (discussing historically plaintiff-friendly 
venues such as Madison County, Illinois, and Hidalgo County, Texas); Kevin M. Clermont & 
Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win 
Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998) (finding empirical evidence 
that plaintiff win rates decrease after removal); Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting 
Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 57 
(2009); James M. Underwood, From Proxy to Principle: Fraudulent Joinder Reconsidered, 69 
ALB. L. REV. 1013, 1013–14 (2006) (“To most seasoned trial lawyers, the identity of the court 
hearing their case is at least as important as the facts of their case. . . . This preoccupation with 
the identity of the decision-maker is no more profound than in the context of the choice between
a state and federal court . . . .”).
19. This is not universally the case. For example, defendants who choose settlement might 
prefer a state court’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Thomas Mayhew, Choosing Federal or State 
Court in Consumer Class Actions, ASS’N BUS. TRIAL LAW., Summer 2007, at 1, 5 (2007) (“[I]n 
some circumstances defendants will want to leave the option of a coupon-based settlement open 
by remaining in state court.”).
20. See E. Farish Percy, Defining the Contours of the Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder 
Doctrine, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 571 (2006) (noting that parties “continue to fight 
forum selection battles with increasing intensity”); Georgene Vairo, Foreword, 37 LOY. L.A. L. 
5
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frequently the easiest hook for removal to federal court, plaintiffs seeking 
to litigate in state courts have long attempted to defeat diversity through 
creative pleading. For example, in Wecker v. National Enamel &
Stamping Co.,21 one of the first Supreme Court recognitions of fraudulent 
joinder, a Missouri citizen fell into a vat of hot grease and sued his 
employer, a New Jersey company, for negligence.22 To avoid federal 
court, the plaintiff joined George Wettengel to the lawsuit, a Missouri 
citizen who “was not . . . a superior or superintendent, [nor] one charged 
with furnishing designs . . . , [nor one with] any authority to direct 
[plaintiff’s] work or to give him instructions as to the manner in which 
his duty should be performed.”23 The Court found “the real purpose in 
joining Wettengel was to prevent the exercise of the right of removal by 
the non-resident defendant” and rejected the attempt to defeat diversity 
jurisdiction.24
In the hundred years since Wecker, fraudulent joinder has become a 
well-established and uncontroversial jurisdictional doctrine,25 protecting 
foreign defendants from possible in-state bias,26 and offering defendants 
in unfriendly state courts procedural grounds to defeat sham joinders. 
Fraudulent joinder preserved access to federal courts in many situations, 
but did not cover others, particularly many class actions filed in state 
court. In response, Congress expanded diversity jurisdiction over mass 
actions in 2005. CAFA27 expanded federal court jurisdiction to mass 
actions with 100 or more plaintiffs and $5,000,000 or more in
                                                                                                                     
REV. 1393, 1393–94 (2004) (“Year by year, the forum selection battle . . . becomes ever more 
fierce . . . .”). 
21. 204 U.S. 176 (1907).
22. Id. at 178–79.
23. Id. at 184–85.
24. Id. at 186; see also Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152–53 (1914) 
(fraudulent joinder cannot defeat removal); Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1068 
(9th Cir. 2001) (court may resolve fraudulent joinder by piercing the pleadings and considering 
summary judgment-type evidence); Parks v. N.Y. Times Co., 308 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1962) 
(examining standards for proving fraudulent joinder). The doctrine was partially codified in 1948, 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1948) (“A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which 
any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to 
invoke the jurisdiction of such court.”). For an academic history of fraudulent joinder, see E. 
Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court Based on 
Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 211–15 (2005).
25. See, e.g., LINDA MULLENIX ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS AND 
JURISDICTION 161–62 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing the doctrine of fraudulent joinder).
26. See id. This provides some rationale for 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2)’s prohibition on 
removing a case against an in-state defendant under traditional diversity principles.
27. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–
15 (2012)).
6
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controversy.28 CAFA required only minimal diversity—that any plaintiff 
be from a different state than any defendant.29 This vastly expanded 
federal court jurisdiction over mass actions, and so plaintiffs seeking to 
litigate in state court began avoiding CAFA through various mechanisms, 
such as stipulating to below $5,000,000 in controversy,30 and aggregating 
slightly less than 100 plaintiffs per action.31
However, aggregating up to even ninety-nine plaintiffs per action still 
required avoiding traditional diversity jurisdiction. In national-scale 
litigation, this could be accomplished through a mix-and-match 
approach. Plaintiff attorneys with national reach could retain a number of 
clients domiciled in the defendant’s home state(s) and group filings for 
these plaintiffs with other diverse plaintiffs across the country. Among 
numerous possible examples, in litigation against Sofradim (a French 
corporation) and C.R. Bard (a New Jersey corporation), alleging the 
companies’ surgical mesh products caused injury, attorneys aggregated 
three New Jersey plaintiffs with 90 other plaintiffs, and filed a joint suit 
in California state court.32 Because C.R. Bard was not diverse from the 
three New Jersey plaintiffs, the plaintiffs’ attorneys hoped to avoid 
federal court. In Kraft v. Johnson & Johnson,33 fifty-two plaintiffs sued 
Johnson & Johnson (a New Jersey corporation) in Texas state court over 
alleged injuries from Johnson & Johnson’s transvaginal surgical mesh.34
Among the fifty-two plaintiffs was a single New Jersey plaintiff to defeat 
diversity, and fifty-one from other states.35 Similarly, in Evans v. Johnson 
& Johnson,36 plaintiffs aggregated ninety-five plaintiffs together in a 
                                                                                                                     
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
29. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
30. E.g., Standard Fire Ins., v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1348 (2013) (requiring a binding 
stipulation to limit the amount in controversy).
31. E.g., Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 885 (11th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs avoided 
jurisdiction under CAFA by splitting 104 plaintiffs into two complaints, one for plaintiffs with 
last names beginning A to L, and another for plaintiffs with last names beginning L to Z. Id.
32. Dekalb v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. CV-15-6063-R, 2015 WL 6134339, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 
19, 2015).
33. 97 F. Supp. 3d 846 (S.D. W. Va. 2015).
34. Id. at 849. The case was removed to Texas federal court then transferred to an MDL in 
West Virginia.
35. Id.; see also Torres v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:14–cv–29741, 2015 WL 4888749, at 
*1 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 17, 2015) (aggregating twenty-four plaintiffs and filing in New Mexico 
state court, similarly including one plaintiff from New Jersey to defeat diversity with New Jersey 
defendant); Bragg v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:14–cv–29743, 2015 WL 4889308, at *1 (S.D. W.
Va. Aug. 17, 2015) (aggregating fifty plaintiffs and filing in Texas state court, including one 
plaintiff from New Jersey to defeat diversity with New Jersey defendant).
36. No. 2:14–cv–29700, 2015 WL 1650402 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 14, 2015).
7
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Texas state court filing, also including one non-diverse plaintiff from 
New Jersey to defeat diversity.37
Defendants confronted with this aggregation of claims in unfriendly 
forums had little recourse, despite CAFA’s preference for federal 
jurisdiction over mass actions. Fraudulent joinder applies to joinder of 
defendants, not plaintiffs.38 Plaintiffs, as masters of their complaints, 
have great ability to influence the choice of forum, such as by choosing 
the initial forum and whether to raise potential federal claims.39 So long 
as plaintiffs stay within bounds of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(the Rules), courts have not discouraged them from seeking full 
advantage of the ability to influence forum selection.40 Because of this, 
the next Part shows how developments in jurisdictional doctrine, rather 
than interpretations of the Rules, extend the possibility of federal court 
jurisdiction to such suits.
II. FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION AFTER DAIMLER AND WALDEN
This Part examines how recent developments in federal court 
jurisdictional analysis limit plaintiffs’ forum-selection power.
A. From Pennoyer and International Shoe to Goodyear
Courts may only exercise jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, a requirement 
embodied in that bane of first-year procedure students, Pennoyer v. 
Neff.41 Due process requires both subject matter jurisdiction over the 
                                                                                                                     
37. Id. at *1.
38. See Matthew C. Monahan, De-Frauding the System: Sham Plaintiffs and the Fraudulent 
Joinder Doctrine, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1345 (2012) (urging courts to extend fraudulent 
joinder to plaintiff-side situations, such as when a plaintiff “pleaded false jurisdictional facts or if 
some outside factor estopped the plaintiff from joining the suit”); Percy, supra note 20, at 606 
(“The traditional fraudulent joinder doctrine is typically applied in cases where the . . . [plaintiff] 
fraudulently join[s] a non-diverse defendant.”).
39. E.g., Caterpillar Inc., v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
40. See, e.g., Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting after 
district court imposed sanctions for “manipulative pleading practices” that “[w]e are not 
convinced that such practices were anything to be discouraged”); see also Scimone v. Carnival 
Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 885 (11th Cir. 2013) (splitting plaintiffs into groups less than 100 based on 
last name when filing).
41. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). Indeed, one could pen an entire article on this aspect of 
Pennoyer. See, e.g., M.C. BRUCE, SIDEBAR: A SIDEWAYS LOOK AT THE LAWYER’S LIFE 5 (2014) 
(“Lawyers are not funny. If you have ever tried to read a so-called humor column in any local bar
association paper, you will notice that . . . [i]t is usually filled with words like res ipsa loquitor
and citations to Pennoyer v. Neff.”); Borchers, supra note 3, at 2 (“Some meanies like me make 
students read Pennoyer . . . .”); Thesealocust, Pennoyer v. Neff, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/LawSchool/comments/3i5s8g/pennoyer_v_neff/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2016) (“Pennoyer v. Neff is our way of saying ‘welcome to law school, tuition is non-
8
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dispute and personal jurisdiction over the parties.42 Since the Supreme 
Court updated Pennoyer’s physical presence analysis in International 
Shoe v. Washington,43 the personal jurisdiction due process inquiry has 
centered on whether a defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with 
a state to justify jurisdiction.44 If “minimum contacts” exist sufficient to 
not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” then 
due process is satisfied and a court’s exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. 
International Shoe’s progeny nuanced the idea of “minimum contacts,” 
but International Shoe remained the standard.45
However, for corporations, both Pennoyer’s requirement of physical 
presence and International Shoe’s contacts test remained remarkably 
fuzzy. Courts struggled to define the boundaries, and even distinguish, 
between these jurisdictional requirements.46 To clarify, in 1984’s 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall47 Justice Harry Blackmun
footnoted the terminology of “specific” versus “general” jurisdiction 
borrowed from a Harvard Law Review article by Professors Arthur von 
Mehren and Donald Trautman.48 In 2011’s Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations S.A. v. Brown,49 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg brought 
Professor von Mehren and Professor Trautman’s jurisdictional theory out 
of the footnotes.50
In Goodyear, a bus accident in France killed two boys from North 
Carolina.51 The boys’ parents sued the companies who manufactured the 
tires used on the bus in North Carolina state court.52 Among the parties 
named in the suit were two foreign subsidiaries of Goodyear USA, 
                                                                                                                     
refundable.’”). Whether these are justified (or humorous) is beyond the scope of this Article. But 
we digress.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(2).
43. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
44. Id. at 316; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (“Thus, the relationship 
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty 
of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry into 
personal jurisdiction.”). 
45. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–93 (1980) 
(discussing the development of the Court’s jurisdictional precedent since International Shoe).
46. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) 
(noting the North Carolina Supreme Court’s “[c]onfusing or blending general and specific 
jurisdictional inquiries”).
47. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
48. Id. at 414 nn.8–9 (citing Arthur von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136–64 (1966)).
49. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
50. Id. at 919.
51. Id. at 918.
52. Id.
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organized in and operating out of Turkey, France, and Luxembourg.53
After the North Carolina Court of Appeals found jurisdiction under a 
“stream of commerce” theory, the Supreme Court reversed, finding first 
that personal jurisdiction is either specific or general,54 and that general 
jurisdiction arises when a non-resident defendant’s “affiliations with the 
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at 
home in the forum State.”55 The only contact the foreign subsidiaries of
Goodyear USA had with North Carolina was that tires made by the 
subsidiaries had been sold in North Carolina.56 The subsidiaries “have no 
place of business, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina. They 
do not design, manufacture, or advertise their products in North 
Carolina.”57 As such, regardless of whether their tires were sold in North 
Carolina through “a highly-organized distribution process,” no general 
jurisdiction over the subsidiaries existed.58
Because there was no general jurisdiction, a North Carolina court 
could rely only on specific jurisdiction to bring the foreign subsidiaries 
within its authority. In contrast to general jurisdiction, specific 
jurisdiction arises from a defendant’s case- and plaintiff-specific contacts 
with a forum.59 In essence, specific jurisdiction requires the plaintiff’s 
particular claim arise out of or be related to the defendant’s forum related 
activities.60 In Goodyear, the facts giving rise to the plaintiffs’ claims did 
not stem from actions by the foreign subsidiaries in North Carolina, 
                                                                                                                     
53. Id. at 919 (“Opinions in the wake of the pathmarking International Shoe decision have 
differentiated between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked 
jurisdiction.”); see Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2014) (tracing 
history of differentiation between general and specific jurisdiction), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 
(2015).
54. In contrast to the “sliding scale” between specific and personal jurisdiction that some 
have divined post-International Shoe. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal 
Jurisdiction: It’s Not General Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, but Is It Constitutional?, 48 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559, 580–82 (1998).
55. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
56. Id. at 920–21.
57. Id. at 921.
58. Id. at 922, 929. The Court also rejected a “single enterprise” theory of Goodyear, which 
would have held its discrete subsidiaries as parts of a whole, justifying jurisdiction against the 
foreign subsidiaries based on jurisdiction over Goodyear USA alone. Id. at 930–31.
59. Specific Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
60. E.g., Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(requiring that a non-resident defendant purposefully direct his activities or avail himself of the 
privileges of the forum, that the claim arise out of or relate to forum activities, and that the exercise 
of jurisdiction be consistent with fair play and substantial justice).
10
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despite sale of their tires within the state, so no specific jurisdiction 
existed.61
In sum, Goodyear held that because specific and general jurisdiction 
encompass the two ways a party might have contacts with a state, and 
because neither existed, jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries was 
improper. Crucially for the following decisions in Daimler and Walden,
the Court found the split between general and specific personal 
jurisdiction to be comprehensive. That is, if neither general nor specific 
personal jurisdiction exists, then no personal jurisdiction exists, without 
middle ground.62 After establishing that personal jurisdiction was 
comprised of these two dichotomous parts in Goodyear, the Court 
proceeded to tighten each part. The Court first tightened general 
jurisdiction in Daimler, and then tightened specific jurisdiction in 
Walden.
B. Daimler AG v. Bauman and General Jurisdiction
Daimler A.G. is a German corporation, headquartered in Germany.63
The California plaintiffs in Daimler alleged that Daimler’s Argentinian 
subsidiary worked with state security forces to torture and kill relatives 
of the plaintiffs during Argentina’s “Dirty War” in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.64 The plaintiffs made two jurisdictional arguments. First, 
they attempted to show that Daimler A.G. itself had a presence in 
California, and second, that an agency theory applied through Mercedes-
Benz USA, LLC, a U.S. subsidiary of Daimler incorporated in Delaware 
and operating out of New Jersey.65 Although Mercedes-Benz USA had 
ample contacts with the state of California, including a regional office 
and billions of dollars of sales,66 the Court summarily rejected the agency 
theory, noting that such a theory “appears to subject foreign corporations 
to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or 
affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view 
of general jurisdiction’ . . . rejected in Goodyear.”67 But even if the
agency theory had been viable, and if Mercedes-Benz USA was at home 
                                                                                                                     
61. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (“Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred in 
France, and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and sold abroad, North 
Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.”).
62. See id. (noting that general and specific jurisdiction should not be “confus[ed]” or 
“blend[ed]”); id. at 927 (noting the “essential difference between case-specific and all-purpose 
(general) jurisdiction”).
63. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 752.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 759–60 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929).
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in California, this was immaterial because Daimler A.G.’s “contacts with 
the State hardly render it at home there.”68
Daimler then defined where “home” is for general jurisdiction 
purposes.69 The Court rejected as “unacceptably grasping” the idea that 
general jurisdiction existed “in every State in which a corporation 
‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of 
business.’”70 It noted that “continuous and systematic” as used in 
International Shoe applied to specific jurisdiction, not general 
jurisdiction, and International Shoe itself distinguished between such 
specific-jurisdiction contacts and those ‘“so substantial . . . as to justify 
suit . . . on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from 
those activities,”’71 or in other words, “all purpose” or general 
jurisdiction. Thus, a corporation is not subject to general jurisdiction in 
every state in which it does business, but rather only where, as in 
Goodyear, it is “fairly regarded at home” by its place of incorporation or 
principal place of business.72
The Court left open a backdoor, but only a small one. The Court noted 
that exceptional circumstances might exist in which “a corporation’s 
operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or 
principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as 
to render the corporation at home in that State.”73 Despite Daimler A.G.’s 
extensive contacts with California, the Court noted that Daimler’s 
activities “plainly do not approach that level.”74 The Court also noted that 
a principal place of business might temporarily reside in a certain state, 
citing Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.75 In Perkins, the 
                                                                                                                     
68. Id. at 760; see also Stanley E. Cox, The Missing “Why” of General Jurisdiction, 76 U.
PITT. L. REV. 153, 203 (2014) (“Extraterritorial regulatory authority—which is what general 
jurisdiction makes available to courts able to exercise it—must be proportional to the level of 
availment of benefits and protections of forum law in which the defendant has engaged. Such all-
purpose availment occurs only with the defendant’s true home state. That state is also therefore 
the only place general jurisdiction can be exercised constitutionally.”).
69. This cut off other possibilities that existed post-Goodyear, such as being subject to 
general jurisdiction in any state with a bricks-and-mortar presence. See Linda J. Silberman, The 
End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the 
United States, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 681 (2015). This may have provided a more 
consistent parallel to the “physical presence” rule for individuals served with process. Id. at 682; 
see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (“The short of the matter is that 
jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process . . . .”).
70. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760–61.
71. Id. at 761 (quoting International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
72. Id. at 760; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924.
73. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. 437 (1952)); see also Keri Martin, What Remains of 
Vicarious Jurisdiction for Establishing General Jurisdiction Over Corporate Defendants after 
12
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Court held that Ohio courts could exercise general jurisdiction over a 
Philippine corporation, although the Philippine corporation was both 
incorporated in and operated from the Philippines.76 Because the 
company had conducted “all key business decisions” out of Ohio during 
the Japanese occupation in the Second World War, Ohio had become, for 
the time, the principal place of business.77
C. Walden v. Fiore and Specific Jurisdiction
A month after tightening general jurisdiction in Daimler, the Court 
did the same for specific jurisdiction. In Walden v. Fiore,78 the Court 
considered whether a Nevada court could exercise specific personal 
jurisdiction over a Georgia defendant whose only contacts with Nevada 
were through delaying the return of funds resulting from allegedly illegal 
activity.79 In August 2006, TSA agents searched Gina Fiore and a 
companion in Puerto Rico.80 The agents found $97,000 in cash and 
questioned Fiore, suspecting involvement with illegal drugs.81 Fiore 
explained the cash was gambling winnings, and agents allowed her to 
depart for Atlanta.82 Upon landing, DEA agents (including Walden) 
seized the cash.83 After Fiore’s attorney became involved and provided 
documentation for the earnings, the DEA returned the funds in March 
2007.84 Fiore filed a Bivens85 suit in Nevada federal court, alleging 
                                                                                                                     
Daimler AG v. Bauman?, 12 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 9–10 (2015) (discussing breadth of 
Perkins).
76. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 439, 448.
77. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779–80 n.11 (1984) (discussing 
Perkins); Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756. The Court’s interpretation of Perkins in Daimler is somewhat 
revisionist, because as the same commentators the Court favored in Goodyear and Daimler note:
The Supreme Court voiced its approval of general jurisdiction in 
Perkins . . . . Finding that the defendant’s forum activities were “continuous and 
systematic,” the Court held that Ohio could assert jurisdiction over a claim 
unrelated to those activities and brought by a nonresident plaintiff. The phrase 
“continuous and systematic” thereafter became the test used by lower courts to 
evaluate assertions of general jurisdiction.
Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 724 (1988)
(footnotes omitted); accord Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
78. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
79. Id. at 1119.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1119–20.
85. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.86 The district court dismissed 
for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed.87
The Supreme Court’s analysis focused on the minimum contacts 
needed to create specific jurisdiction for a non-resident defendant.88 It 
held that “[f]or a state to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, 
the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection 
with the forum State.”89 In particular, “the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside 
there” mattered.90 Because Walden had no contacts with Nevada itself, a 
Nevada court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over him, despite 
however many contacts Walden had with Fiore.91
The best evidence that Walden had no contacts with Nevada related 
to Fiore’s suit was the transferability of Fiore’s injury. Because Fiore 
“would have experienced this same lack of access [to funds] in California, 
Mississippi, or wherever else [she] might have traveled,” Walden’s 
conduct was inherently unconnected to Nevada.92 In other words, because 
nothing but the plaintiff’s residence tethered the suit to the forum state, 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant was improper. “[T]he mere fact 
that [a defendant’s] conduct affected plaintiffs with connections to [a] 
forum State does not suffice to authorize jurisdiction.”93
Through this transferability lens, Walden mirrors Daimler—each 
rejects the idea of nationwide “traveling” personal jurisdiction. In 
Daimler, the court rejected the notion that mere sales within a forum 
created general jurisdiction over a defendant, as if jurisdiction travelled 
along with products in the stream of commerce.94 In Walden, the Court 
rejected the similar notion that specific jurisdiction travelled along with 
                                                                                                                     
86. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1120.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1121.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1122. The Court’s opinion was notably silent on its most recent personal 
jurisdictional opinion, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, which generated a highly fractured 
opinion centered on whether a foreign corporation had targeted activities in a certain state. 564 
U.S. 873, 87.
91. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1126.
92. Id. at 1125.
93. Id. at 1126. Other courts have made clear that personal jurisdiction is also claim-
specific. See, e.g., Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (“When a plaintiff relies 
on specific jurisdiction, he must establish that jurisdiction is proper for ‘each claim asserted 
against a defendant.’” (quoting Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 
1180 (9th Cir. 2004))); Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 289 
(1st Cir. 1999) (“Questions of specific jurisdiction are always tied to the particular claims 
asserted.”).
94. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757 (2014).
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a plaintiff as she moves about the country.95 Rather than travelling, 
jurisdiction is tethered to the home locations of the defendant or the 
defendant’s plaintiff-specific conduct giving rise to the case.
III. FRAUDULENT AGGREGATION: DAIMLER AND WALDEN’S
ONE-TWO PUNCH
This Part discusses the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional tightening in 
Daimler and Walden and explains how this manifests itself in mass tort 
litigation.
A. Daimler and Walden’s Combined Jurisdictional Tightening
When considered together, Daimler and Walden alter the litigation 
landscape by narrowing where plaintiffs may sue. Consider several 
examples. In Barron v. Pfizer, Inc.,96 the plaintiffs alleged Alexander 
Barron suffered birth defects because of his mother’s use of Pfizer’s drug 
Zoloft while pregnant.97 Alexander was born in Florida, which was also 
the state in which his mother had used Zoloft.98 When the lawsuit was 
filed, both child and mother lived in Washington.99 The only connection 
between either party and Missouri was Pfizer’s sale and marketing of 
Zoloft within the state.100 The court noted these “contacts do not relate to 
the causes of action in this suit, which arise out [of] Ms. Barron’s 
ingestion of Zoloft in Florida and Alexander Barron’s subsequent birth,” 
and found no specific jurisdiction.101 It then noted Pfizer is a Delaware 
corporation with its principal place of business in New York, and 
“[m]erely establishing that a corporation regularly conducts business in a 
forum is not sufficient to confer general jurisdiction.”102 Because no 
specific or general jurisdiction existed, there was no personal jurisdiction 
and the court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(2).103
                                                                                                                     
95. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125.
96. No. 4:15-CV-584 CAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136020 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 6, 2015).
97. Id. at *1.
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *4.
103. Id. The court noted multiple prior dismissals under the same jurisdictional theory. See
Clarke v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:15CV1072 AGF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118850, at *5 (E.D. Mo. 
Sept. 8, 2015); Keeley v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4:15CV00583 ERW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85282, at 
*8 (E.D. Mo. June 1, 2015); Fidler v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4:15 CV 582 RWS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
176403, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 25, 2015).
15
Lingwall and Wray: Fraudulent Aggregation: The Effect of Daimler and Walden on Mass
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
614 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
Similarly in ADT, LLC v. Capital Connect, Inc.,104 ADT sued Security 
Investments, an Ohio LLC with its principal place of business in Ohio.105
ADT alleged Security Investments had falsely made customers believe it 
was associated with ADT, violating the Lanham Act and Texas common 
law.106 Security Investments moved to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.107 The court granted the motion, noting “[i]t is ‘incredibly 
difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place 
of incorporation or principal place of business.’”108 In addition, the cause 
of action arose “out of the behavior of Security Investments in dealing 
with its customers in Ohio and Virginia, not in Texas,” so specific 
jurisdiction also lacked.109
The holding in Barron and ADT extends to litigation with multiple 
plaintiffs. In Tulsa Cancer Institute, PLLC v. Genentech, Inc.,110 the 
plaintiff cancer institute sued Genentech for breach of warranty and 
unjust enrichment, alleging Genentech’s vials of Herceptin (a cancer 
medication) contained less usable medication than as labeled.111 After 
some motion practice, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking 
to join seven additional plaintiffs (with identical claims) to the 
litigation.112 Of these seven new plaintiffs, only one had its principal 
place of business in Oklahoma.113 Genentech moved to dismiss the non-
resident plaintiffs for lack of personal jurisdiction.114 As with other states, 
Oklahoma’s long-arm statute permits exercise of jurisdiction on any basis 
consistent with the Constitution,115 so the court proceeded to a due 
process analysis under Daimler and Walden.116 The results should be 
familiar. The court noted that “[e]ach plaintiff . . . must show that its 
claim arises out of or is related to the defendant’s contacts with the 
                                                                                                                     
104. No. 3:15-CV-2252-G, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157025 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2015).
105. Id. at *3 (among other defendants).
106. Id.
107. Id. at *1–2.
108. Id. at *9 (quoting Monkton Ins. Servs. Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014)).
109. Id. at *12; see also Horizon Comics Prod. v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, No. 15-11684, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15659, at *26 (D. Mass. Feb. 9, 2016) (finding no specific jurisdiction over 
Marvel Comics in copyright dispute over “Iron Man” armor despite the Iron Man films being 
shown in Massachusetts).
110. No. 15-CV-157-TCK-TLW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3512 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 12, 2016).
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id.
113. Id. The court referred to these as the “resident plaintiffs” (Tulsa Cancer Institute and 
State of Oklahoma ex rel. Board of Regents of the State of Oklahoma acting on behalf of the 
University of Oklahoma Stephenson Cancer Center). Id. at *6 n.4.
114. Id. at *1.
115. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(F) (2016).
116. Genentech, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3512, at *5–6.
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forum.”117 A “shared nucleus of facts between the claims of the resident 
Plaintiffs and non-resident Plaintiffs” was thus insufficient to establish 
personal jurisdiction.118 Because general jurisdiction also did not exist 
(Genentech was not an Oklahoma corporation, nor was its principal place 
of business in Oklahoma), the claims against the non-resident defendants 
were dismissed.119
One final example shows the effect of these jurisdictional arguments 
beyond forum alone. In Jaeger v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp.,120
plaintiffs filed a mass action in the Southern District of Illinois regarding 
Howmedica’s “CerviCore” spinal device.121 Howmedica is a New Jersey 
corporation, so no general jurisdiction existed, and the facts relevant to 
Jaeger’s claim occurred in California.122 Howmedica therefore moved to 
transfer Jaeger’s case to California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).123 After 
transfer, the Northern District of California concluded that the Illinois 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over Howmedica, so venue had never 
been proper in Illinois in the first place.124 Because of this, the court 
applied California rather than Illinois choice of law rules, found that 
California law applied, and that the case had not been brought within the 
California statute of limitations for personal injury claims.125
B. Jurisdictional Tightening in Mass Litigation
To this point Goodyear, Daimler, and Walden accomplished three 
tasks: Goodyear established personal jurisdiction as either general or 
specific,126 and Daimler and Walden tethered those jurisdictional 
possibilities to specific forums. Daimler limited general jurisdiction for 
defendant corporations to the state of incorporation or principal place of 
business,127 and Walden made specific jurisdiction both claim- and 
plaintiff-specific (rather than existing through the sale of products within 
a state generally).128 Whereas almost any contact with a state allowed 
                                                                                                                     
117. Id. at *8; see also Urban Textile, Inc. v. A & E Stores, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-01554-CAS, 
2014 WL 3955173, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014) (“It is insufficient that [defendant] conducted 
other business with California, unrelated to plaintiff’s claims.”).
118. Genentech, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3512, at *9. The court also refused to exercise 
jurisdiction over the non-resident plaintiffs under a theory of pendent jurisdiction. Id. at *10.
119. Id. at *12.
120. No. 15-cv-00164-HSG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16493 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2016).
121. Id. at *7.
122. Id. at *18.
123. Id. at *17.
124. Id. at *23.
125. Id. at *26–27.
126. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
127. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
128. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014).
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personal jurisdiction under Perkins,129 now suit can only be brought in a 
state where a defendant is essentially at home or a state in which the 
plaintiff’s claim arose out of the defendant’s activities.130 Hence the 
outcomes in Barron, ADT, Genentech, and Jaeger.
While these outcomes are significant, when Goodyear, Daimler, and 
Walden are considered in light of mass litigation they show an even 
greater change in the litigation landscape. By tethering jurisdiction to a 
defendant’s home state or the state where the plaintiff’s claim arose, the 
Court’s jurisdictional trilogy dramatically expands access to federal 
courts. Again, consider the following. Plaintiffs who seek the efficiencies 
of a mass action but who wish to avoid federal court must defeat both 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (traditional diversity) and 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (CAFA). Because CAFA applies only to 
aggregations of 100 or more plaintiffs per 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5), simply 
aggregating a maximum of ninety-nine plaintiffs per suit is sufficient to 
avoid jurisdiction under § 1332(d).131 However, the plaintiffs must still 
defeat traditional diversity under § 1332(a). Pre-Daimler and Walden,
this was easily done. In a mass action with thousands of plaintiffs from 
across the country, an enterprising attorney could easily find a handful of 
clients domiciled in the defendant’s home state(s). These non-diverse 
plaintiffs could then be strategically allocated in mass actions of up to 
ninety-nine plaintiffs in favorable jurisdictions across the country. 
Because the standard for general jurisdiction under Perkins was merely 
systematic contact with the forum state132—usually satisfied easily in any 
state for a defendant with a nationally distributed product—non-diverse 
plaintiffs defeated diversity jurisdiction for the entire aggregation.133
This piggybacking ends with Goodyear, Daimler, and Walden.134
Because personal jurisdiction is now tethered to a defendant’s home 
                                                                                                                     
129. Even under Perkins there were exceptions refusing to find personal jurisdiction under 
International Shoe alone. E.g., Affordable Healthcare, LLC v. Protus IP Sols., Inc., No.
4:08CV502 RWS, 2009 WL 749536, at *3–4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 19, 2009) (dismissing the claims of 
twenty-five out-of-state plaintiffs in a ninety-seven plaintiff action).
130. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5) (2012).
132. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445–46 (1952).
133. Because non-CAFA mass actions often involve personal injury claims, the 
jurisdictional amounts of $75,000 per plaintiff are usually satisfied easily. See, e.g., JAMES E.
PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 120 (2d ed. 2011) (“[M]ost serious personal 
injury claims will easily satisfy the threshold; even if out-of-pocket losses do not reach the 
threshold, the inclusion of claims for emotional or dignitary injuries, pain and suffering, and 
punitive damages will satisfy federal jurisdiction.”).
134. See Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., No. 4:13–CV–1080 (CEJ), 2014 WL 
50856, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 2014) (refusing to allow a second plaintiff to essentially 
‘piggyback’ onto a first plaintiff’s properly established personal jurisdiction because “[i]t is well-
18
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state(s) or the states in which the defendant’s plaintiff-specific and suit-
related conduct occurred, strategic sprinkling of non-diverse plaintiffs 
around the country to defeat 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) fails. Non-diverse 
plaintiffs must now limit their suits to either the defendant’s home state(s) 
or the states where the defendant’s suit-related conduct affected them 
personally.135 Without the ability of plaintiffs to strategically defeat 
complete diversity through inter-state allocation of non-diverse plaintiffs, 
mass actions previously denied federal court jurisdiction are now the 
domain of the federal courts.
Seen this way, the Court’s jurisdictional trilogy fulfills the promise of 
CAFA in expanding federal court jurisdiction over mass actions. Before 
jurisdiction was tethered to specific forums through Daimler and Walden,
CAFA created incentives to game the 100-plaintiff mark during national-
level litigation. By removing this incentive, the Court put teeth into 
federal court jurisdiction over all mass actions, consistent with the intent 
to “make[] it harder for plaintiffs’ counsel to ‘game the system’ by trying 
to defeat diversity jurisdiction.”136
For example, in the Kraft case discussed above, fifty-two plaintiffs, 
including one non-diverse plaintiff from New Jersey, sued Johnson & 
Johnson (a New Jersey corporation) in Texas state court under a products 
liability theory.137 The defendant Johnson & Johnson removed to federal 
court based on what this Article terms fraudulent aggregation—alleging
the tactical allocation of a non-diverse plaintiff with no connection to the 
forum to defeat diversity—and plaintiffs moved to remand.138 The court 
examined existence of personal jurisdiction, and found general 
jurisdiction lacking because Johnson & Johnson only engaged in business 
in Texas.139 The court rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to “ask the court to 
recognize an additional basis supporting the exercise of all-purpose 
jurisdiction” based on large sales, training of Texas-based employees, 
websites directed at a Texas audience, or whether Texas employees 
received direct-deposit paychecks.140 Because the plaintiffs did not 
                                                                                                                     
established that the requirement for personal jurisdiction cannot be bypassed by proving proper 
joinder”), vacated in part on other grounds, 2014 WL 1347531 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 4, 2014).
135. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
136. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005); see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 
1345, 1350 (2013) (articulating CAFA’s primary objective of putting national cases of great 
importance in federal court).
137. Kraft v. Johnson & Johnson, 97 F. Supp. 3d 846, 848–49 (S.D. W. Va. 2015).
138. Id. at 849.
139. Id. at 854.
140. Id. at 853, 854 (finding that “permitting the maintenance of a website accessible in all 
states to tip the scale in the general-jurisdiction calculus would effectively eviscerate the doctrine: 
the defendants here and countless other corporations, large and small, would be subject to all-
purpose jurisdiction nationwide”).
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contest specific jurisdiction,141 the claims against the non-Texas, and 
non-diverse, plaintiffs were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.142
The remaining plaintiffs were from Texas, completely diverse from 
Johnson & Johnson, and so the plaintiffs’ motion to remand was 
denied.143
In a similar case against the same defendant, Torres v. Johnson & 
Johnson,144 attorneys aggregated twenty-two plaintiffs and brought suit 
in New Mexico state court, again including one New Jersey plaintiff with 
no connection to New Mexico to defeat diversity.145 Johnson & Johnson 
removed to federal court on the basis of no personal jurisdiction over the 
New Jersey plaintiff.146 The court agreed, finding Johnson & Johnson was 
not incorporated in nor operated out of New Mexico, and “the bald 
allegation that the defendants[’] conduct substantial business in the forum 
is unavailing for the purposes of general jurisdiction.”147 The court then 
turned to specific jurisdiction and summarily noted that out-of-state 
plaintiffs in the litigation “failed to allege that the purported injuries . . . 
occurred in New Mexico.”148 After dismissing the New Jersey plaintiff, 
complete diversity existed and the case remained in federal court.149
The facts played out similarly in Locke v. Ethicon Inc.150 There, 
seventy-seven plaintiffs brought suit in Texas state court against Ethicon, 
a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New 
Jersey.151 One of the seventy-seven plaintiffs was a New Jersey resident, 
included in an attempt to defeat diversity jurisdiction, and only one was 
a resident of Texas.152 Ethicon removed to federal court, arguing that the 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the single New Jersey resident 
who defeated diversity, and plaintiffs moved to remand.153 In response, 
Ethicon argued that the non-Texas plaintiffs “do not allege injuries in 
                                                                                                                     
141. Id. at 851 n.2.
142. Id. at 854.
143. Id. at 854–55. 
144. No. 2:14–cv–29741, 2015 WL 4888749 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 17, 2015).
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *5.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *6; see also Bragg v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:14–cv–29743, 2015 WL 4889308, 
at *7 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 17, 2015) (dismissing a similar aggregation for lack of general 
jurisdiction, when plaintiffs failed to argue the existence of specific jurisdiction); Evans v. 
Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:14–cv–29700, 2015 WL 1650402, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 14, 2015).
150. 58 F. Supp. 3d 757, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 759–60 (noting that plaintiffs’ claimed “complete diversity is lacking because 
New Jersey litigants appear on both sides of the proverbial ‘v’”). The remaining plaintiffs came 
from fourteen different states. Id. at 759 & n.1.
153. Id. at 760.
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Texas to trigger the specific jurisdiction of the Court,” and “they are not 
‘at home’ in Texas within the meaning of Daimler.”154 The court agreed, 
rejecting similar plaintiff-side arguments as in Kraft, and the case 
remained in federal court.155
As shown in these illustrations, thus far the application of personal 
jurisdiction arguments in mass litigation has been limited primarily to 
general jurisdiction under Daimler, while glossing over specific 
jurisdiction under Walden. At least in part, this is because plaintiffs 
simply have not raised specific jurisdiction arguments as frequently.156
As more courts find a lack of general jurisdiction, this is sure to change, 
especially with the possibility that a court might read specific jurisdiction 
broadly.157 But as plaintiffs dodge Daimler, they are immediately faced 
with Walden, thus the one-two punch of Daimler and Walden together 
creates the doctrine of fraudulent aggregation.158
IV. CHALLENGES TO THE ADOPTION OF FRAUDULENT AGGREGATION
Whether the doctrine of fraudulent aggregation becomes as 
established as fraudulent joinder depends on whether lower courts 
recreate pre-Daimler general jurisdiction under another name. This 
depends on several factors, such as the reception Daimler receives in 
lower courts, how broadly specific jurisdiction is read in wake of Walden,
how pre-Daimler and Walden precedent regarding fraudulent misjoinder 
fairs, and whether Congress maintains the service of process standard 
currently embodied in Rule 4. 
Since Daimler was decided, some courts have begun finding 
jurisdiction over corporate defendants under a consent theory.159 Under 
                                                                                                                     
154. Id.
155. Id. at 765.
156. E.g., Kraft v. Johnson & Johnson, 97 F. Supp. 3d 846, 851 n.2 (S.D. W. Va. 2015)
(failing to contest specific jurisdiction); Bragg v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:14–cv–29743, 2015
WL 4889308, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 17, 2015) (failing to raise specific jurisdiction).
157. See infra Section IV.
158. At risk of over-extending the metaphor, Goodyear established that personal jurisdiction 
boxers have only two fists (general or specific), with no head-butts in-between. See Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919–20 (2011). For Daimler and Walden 
acting together, see Tulsa Cancer Inst., PLLC v. Genentech Inc., No. 15-CV-157-TCK-TLW,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3512, at *7–10 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 12, 2016).
159. E.g., Regal Beloit Am., Inc. v. Broad Ocean Motor LLC, No. 4:16-cv-00111-JCH, 2016 
WL 3549624, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 30, 2016) (stating that defendant “purposefully availed itself 
of the privilege of conducting business with residents of Missouri, inter alia, by registering with 
the State of Missouri, and as such has established sufficient minimum contacts with the State of 
Missouri”); McDonald AG Inc. v. Syngenta AG, Case No. 14-md-2591-JWL, 2016 WL 2866166, 
at *1 (D. Kan. May 17, 2016); Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d. 
572, 576 (D. Del. 2015) (“Daimler does not change the fact that [the defendant] consented to this 
Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction when it registered to do business and appointed an agent 
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this theory, registering to do business in a state is sufficient to bring a 
corporate defendant under all-purpose jurisdiction within the state, even 
if clearly not “at home” under Daimler. Because the large corporations 
typically named as defendants in mass litigations are often registered 
across multiple (or all) states, this argument has the potential to recreate 
pre-Daimler general jurisdiction under another name. If pre-Daimler
general jurisdiction is restored in all but name, then fraudulent 
aggregation of claims becomes possible again in any state in which a 
corporation registers an agent. While other courts disagree, such as the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noting, “Daimler’s ruling 
would be robbed of meaning by a back-door thief,”160 if Daimler is 
undercut, so is fraudulent aggregation.
General jurisdiction may also be recreated in all but name through a 
broad reading of specific jurisdiction. If specific jurisdiction is extended 
sufficiently then it could swallow Daimler alongside fraudulent 
aggregation. For example, in Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court,161 California and non-California plaintiffs sued Bristol-Meyers 
                                                                                                                     
for service of process in the State of Delaware.”); Bailen v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 
190318/12, 2014 WL 3885949, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014) (“Although Daimler clearly 
narrows the reach of New York courts in terms of its exercise of general jurisdiction over foreign 
entities, it does not change the law with respect to personal jurisdiction based on consent.”
(footnote omitted)). See generally Kevin D. Benish, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration 
Statutes, and General Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609, 1610–
14 (2015) (discussing Daimler’s impact on general jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause and 
the notion of “consent-by-registration”); Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections 
on Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 675, 687–88 (2015) (discussing consent to jurisdiction and the questions Daimler raises 
about this theory).
160. Brown v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016); see also ADT,
LLC v. Capital Connect, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2252-G, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157025, at *13 (N.D. 
Tex. Nov. 20, 2015) (“The act of registering to do business in Texas does not establish 
jurisdiction . . . .”); Keeley v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4:15CV00583 ERW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85282,
at *8–9 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2015) (“If following these [registration] statutes creates jurisdiction, 
national companies would be subject to suit all over the country. This result is contrary to the 
holding in Daimler that merely doing business in a state is not enough to establish general 
jurisdiction.”); Chatwal Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Dollywood Co., 90 F. Supp. 3d 97, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that registration is “insufficient to confer general jurisdiction”). See 
generally Benish, supra note 159, at 1611–12 (describing circuit split over constitutionality of 
consent-by-registration).
161. 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016). As mentioned in note 2, as this Article went to press the U.S. 
Supreme Court overturned the California Supreme Court’s decision. The Court noted: 
Under the California approach, the strength of the requisite connection between 
the forum and the specific claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant has extensive 
forum contacts that are unrelated to those claims. Our cases provide no support 
for this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious form of general 
jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, a defendant’s general connections with the 
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Squibb (BMS), a Delaware corporation operating from New York.162 The 
plaintiffs alleged the drug Plavix, manufactured by BMS, caused 
injury.163 The California Supreme Court ultimately accepted an appeal 
involving eight complaints on behalf of 678 individuals, only eighty-six 
of which lived in California.164 In a 4–3 decision, the court sensibly found 
BMS was not subject to general jurisdiction in California, even going so 
far as to reject the plaintiffs’ registration theory.165 Unfortunately, the 
court found specific jurisdiction over the claims of all plaintiffs, stating 
that “under this specific set of circumstances . . . for purposes of 
establishing the requisite minimum contacts, plaintiffs’ claims 
concerning the allegedly defective design and marketing of Plavix bear a
substantial nexus with or connection to BMS’s extensive contacts with 
California.”166 Specifically, the court cited the drug’s nationwide 
marketing, sales of drugs in the state, BMS’s relationship with a 
distributor in the state, the maintenance of research and development 
facilities in the state, and “hundreds of California employees.”167
In other words, after rejecting general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
of California then immediately recreated it under the guise of specific 
jurisdiction, sounding remarkably like the view rejected in Daimler:
“Plaintiffs would have us look beyond the exemplar bases Goodyear
identified, and approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State 
in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and 
systematic course of business.’ That formulation, we hold, is 
unacceptably grasping.”168
The dissent took notice, agreeing that general jurisdiction was lacking, 
but sharply criticizing the holding of specific jurisdiction, stating that “the 
majority expands specific jurisdiction to the point that, for a large 
category of defendants, it becomes indistinguishable from general 
jurisdiction.”169 If decisions like Bristol-Meyers undercut the prohibition 
against finding general jurisdiction in every state in which a corporation 
                                                                                                                     
forum are not enough. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., No. 16-466, slip op. at 7 (2017) (emphasis added); 
see also BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, No. 16-405, slip op. at 2 (2017) (affirming the general 
jurisdiction principles of Daimler in context of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act).
162. Id. at 878–79.
163. Id. at 878.
164. Id. at 877.
165. Id. at 884 (“[A] corporation’s appointment of an agent for service of process, when 
required by state law, cannot compel its surrender to general jurisdiction for disputes unrelated to 
its California transactions.”).
166. Id. at 890.
167. Id. at 894.
168. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760–61 (2014) (citation omitted).
169. Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 896.
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does business, then non-diverse plaintiffs will again defeat diversity in 
any state via what can be fairly called “jurisdiction by joinder.”170
Next, fraudulent aggregation depends on how lower courts treat pre-
Daimler and Walden authority on joinder of plaintiffs. For example, in 
Bradshaw v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC,171 both resident and non-resident 
plaintiffs claimed they were injured by the defendant corporation’s pelvic 
mesh product.172 Despite no connection between the out-of-state 
plaintiffs and the forum state, the court applied a “common nucleus of 
fact” theory based on pre-Daimler and Walden authority in the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to reject the defendant’s attempt to 
remove to federal court.173 By ignoring Daimler and Walden’s plaintiff-
specific requirements for jurisdiction, this theory again has the potential 
to recreate pre-Daimler general jurisdiction—nationwide products 
liability suits generally focus on similar allegations among plaintiffs 
allegedly injured by the same product.174
Finally, the long-term effect of Walden depends on whether Rule 4 is 
ever amended to allow nationwide service of process. Although Walden
was decided on constitutional rather than procedural grounds, the court 
in Walden only lacked jurisdiction because Rule 4 establishes personal 
jurisdiction through serving a defendant “who is subject to the 
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district 
court is located.”175 Because state court jurisdiction requires a due 
process analysis, Walden was resolved on constitutional grounds. If 
Congress authorized national service of process by amending Rule 4, the 
due process restriction on state adjudication would arguably disappear.176
                                                                                                                     
170. Id. at 905. On the same day as the Supreme Court of California’s ruling, the Illinois 
Court of Appeals found specific jurisdiction on similar grounds. M.M. ex rel. Myers v. 
GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 2016 WL 4506714, at *7–8 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 2016).  Plaintiffs in 
the Illinois case conceded the general jurisdiction point, but on specific jurisdiction, the court 
found “purposeful contacts” where GlaxoSmithKline conducted clinical trials in the state, had 
employees in the state, and maintained a registered agent there for service. Id.
171. No. 4:15-CV-332 SNLJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72088 (E.D. Mo. June 4, 2015).
172. Id. at *1.
173. Id. at *5–6 (citing In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 622 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(finding that plaintiffs were not fraudulently misjoined and declining to decide whether the 
doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder existed)); see also Memorandum and Order at 3–4, Turley v. 
Janssen Research & Dev. LLC, No. 4:15cv1553 SNLJ (E.D. Mo. Dec. 23, 2015) (finding that 
plaintiffs were properly joined because their claims arose out of the same transactions or 
occurrence and included common questions).
174. See Kraft v. Johnson & Johnson, 97 F. Supp. 3d 846, 850–51 (S.D. W. Va. 2015)
(discussing the difference between fraudulent misjoinder under Rule 20 and the lack of personal 
jurisdiction).
175. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
176. See Entek Corp. v. Sw. Pipe & Supply Co., 683 F. Supp. 1092, 1100 (N.D. Tex. 1988); 
Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Around Horizontal Federalism Rather 
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Without due process restrictions on adjudication by state courts, no limit 
on aggregation of claims would exist under Walden. With this said, while 
Congress has authorized national service in some contexts, such as 
antitrust and securities law,177 there is no indication it plans to amend 
Rule 4 more generally.
CONCLUSION
As with the Supreme Court’s summary judgment trilogy in the 
1980s178 and the Twiqbal revolution in the 2000s,179 the Court’s 
jurisdictional tightening in Daimler and Walden will have long-term 
consequences for civil litigation.180 This Article highlights the application 
of Daimler and Walden in mass litigation, in which heightened 
jurisdictional requirements will expand defendants’ access to federal 
courts by ending the practice of tactically allocating non-diverse plaintiffs 
between states to defeat diversity. While this doctrine of fraudulent 
aggregation faces challenges, chiefly through the potential recreation of 
general jurisdiction under new names, early cases show courts willing to 
embrace this new jurisdictional landscape. For defendants facing mass 
actions in historically unfriendly forums, fraudulent aggregation brings 
welcome relief, just as fraudulent joinder did to individual actions a 
hundred years prior.
                                                                                                                     
Than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 769, 774–75 (2015); Daniel 
Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts: Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford v. 
Briggs, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 713, 713–16 (2015).
177. Klerman, supra note 176, at 716.
178. See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (defining burden of 
parties at summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) 
(establishing the “no genuine issue of material fact” standard); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596–98 (1986) (approving dismissal of facially implausible 
claim at summary judgment stage). 
179. “Twiqbal” is a combination of two case names: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
180. While academic commentary questions what effect the summary judgment trilogy or 
Twiqbal actually had on litigation, these cases remain among the most cited Supreme Court cases 
of all time. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2278 (2012) (finding Twombly
and Iqbal increased the number of complaints failing to reach discovery); Linda S. Mullenix, The 
25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado About Very Little, 43 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 561, 562 (2012) (noting little effect of the summary judgment trilogy outside courses in 
civil procedure). 
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